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Recent Decisions
TRADE REGULATIONS-CLAYTON ACT-ROBINSON-PATMAN PRICE
DISCRIMINATION ACT-OIL COMPANY-The United States Supreme
Court has held that a price differential that accords due recogni-
tion and reimbursement for actual functions performed does not
trigger the presumption of an injury to competition, and therefore
is legal under the Clayton Act.
Texaco v Hasbrouck, US -, 110 S Ct 2535 (1990).
During the period between 1972-1981, petitioner (hereinafter,
"Texaco") sold gasoline to respondents' at retail tankwagon prices
(hereinafter, "RTW")2 while granting substantial discounts to two
wholesale distributors, Gull Oil Company (hereinafter, "Gull") and
Dompier Oil Company (hereinafter, "Dompier"). 3 The distributors,
in turn, sold the gasoline at the retail level under both indepen-
dent and Texaco names, passing the savings on to consumers."
Both Gull and Dompier collected the product from the Texaco
plant, utilizing their own tank trucks, and delivered it directly to
the retail outlets.6 Texaco paid Dompier the equivalent of the com-
mon carrier rate for delivering the gasoline, while at the same time
denying permission to two of the respondents to haul their own
1. Respondents are twelve independent owners of thirteen Texaco stations in the
Spokane, Washington area. Texaco v Hasbrouck, __ US - , 110 S Ct 2535, 2539 (1990).
2. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2538.
3. Id at 2539. Gull Oil Company is headquartered in Seattle and distributes petro-
leum products in four western states under the Gull Oil name. The purchase price from
Texaco ranged from 4 to 6c below the RTW price. The Dompier Oil Company is a full line
distributor of Texaco products and its sale of Texaco gasoline, under the Texaco name,
represented more than three-quarters of its business. Dompier's purchase price ranged from
$3.95 to $3.65 below the RTW price. Id.
4. Id at 2540.
5. Id.
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gasoline using their own tank trucks."
During the period in question, the stations supplied by the
wholesalers enjoyed a tremendous increase in both retail sales vol-
ume and percent of total Texaco sales.7 At the same time, respon-
dents' share of the market collapsed. 8 Evidence was produced at
trial that two Texaco executives were aware of the dramatic growth
of Dompier during this period, attributing it to both the distribu-
tor discount and the hauling allowance.9 However, in response to
earlier complaints from individual respondents regarding Dom-
pier's aggressive pricing, Texaco officials stated that they "couldn't
understand it."10
Respondents filed suit in July, 1976, claiming Texaco violated
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton
Act (hereinafter, "Act"), by subjecting respondents to price dis-
crimination vis-a-vis the wholesale distributors." After a four week
trial, respondents obtained a jury verdict and were awarded dam-
ages. 2 Texaco appealed this verdict.13 During the pendency of that
appeal, the method used at trial to calculate respondent's damages,
predicated on the difference between the RTW price and the price
paid by Dompier, was deemed improper by the United States Su-
6. Id at 2550.
7. Id at 2540. Between 1970 and 1975 the Dompier-owned stations' sales volume
increased from 155,152 gallons to 462,956 gallons, representing an increase from 20.7% to
almost 50% of Texaco's Spokane sales. Id.
8. Id. Texaco's sales to respondents declined from a monthly volume of 569,269 gal-
lons in 1970 to 389,557 gallons in 1975. Respondents' share of the market for Texaco gaso-
line declined from 76% to 49%. By the end of 1975, seven of the thirteen stations owned by
respondents were out of business. Id at 2539.
9. Id at 2540. "We believe that the dramatic shift in gasoline sales from the inde-
pendent retailer classes of purchaser to the independent distributor classes of purchaser can
be explained almost entirely by the magnitude of the distributor discount and the hauling
allowance." Id at 2540, n.4.
10. Id at 2540.
11. Id. Section 2(a) of the Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . either directly or indi-
rectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition . . . or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ...
15 USC § 13(a) (West 1973).
12. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2540.
13. Id.
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preme Court." Based upon that error, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit remanded for a new trial.16 At the second trial, Tex-
aco claimed that the discounted prices afforded the wholesalers
were "justified by cost savings,' 6 were the product of a good faith
attempt to meet competition,17 and were lawful 'functional dis-
counts.' "18 The jury ultimately found for the respondents and
awarded damages of $449,000.18 Texaco moved for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict,20 claiming that the functional discounts
did not adversely affect competition within the meaning of the Act
because any injury to respondents was attributable to decisions
made independently by the distributors."' The district court de-
14. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the method of calculating damages announced in
Chrysler Credit Corp. v J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607 F2d 1133 (5th Cir 1979), aff'd sub nom,
451 US 557 (1981) (as calculated by the actual damages suffered as a result of the price
discrimination), and expressly rejected the method utilized by the district court in Has-
brouck, known as the "Fowler rule." Fowler Manuf Co v Gorlick, 415 F2d 1248 (9th Cir
1969), cert denied, 396 US 1012, (1970) (as calculated by the difference between the dis-
counted and non-discounted prices). Hasbrouck v Texaco, Inc., 663 F2d 930, 932 (9th Cir
1981).
15. Hasbrouck, 663 F2d at 932. Although the court of appeals rejected Texaco's de-
fenses on the issue of liability, they remanded on both the issue of liability and damages.
The court did not believe that the determination of liability was fairly separable from the
calculation of damages in a private antitrust action. Id at 933-34.
16. The cost justification defense claimed by Texaco is prescribed in section 2(a) of
the Act:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such pur-
chasers sold or delivered.
15 USC § 13(a) (emphasis added).
17. Section 2(b) of the Act provides in part:
Provided, however, [tihat nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.
15 USC § 13(b) (West 1973) (emphasis added).
18. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct 2535, 2540 (1990) (citing Hasbrouck v Texaco, Inc., 634 F
Supp 34 (E D Wash 1985)). "[T]he term functional discount means a price concession based
on characteristics of the buyer, such as his place in the channels of distribution, his struc-
ture, or the type of service he performs[.]" Corwin D. Edwards, The Price Discrimination
Law (Banta 1959).
19. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct 2535, 2541. The cost justification defense wasdisallowed by
the court as unsupported by the evidence, and the jury rejected the other two defenses. Id.
20. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or judgment non obstante veredicto, is a
judgment rendered in favor of one party notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of the other
party. Black's Law Dictionary 952 (West, 5th ed .1979).
21. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2541. See Hasbrouck v Texaco, Inc, 634 F Supp 34, 43 (E
D Wash 1985); Texaco, Inc v Hasbrouck, 842 F2d at 1043-44 (9th Cir 1987).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 29:803
nied the motion.22 The court of appeals affirmed.2 s The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider Texaco's argument that legiti-
mate functional discounts do not violate section 2(a) of the Act
because a seller should not be held responsible for the independent
pricing decisions of its customers.2" Although agreeing with the ba-
sic thrust of Texaco's argument, that legitimate functional dis-
counts do not violate the Act, a unanimous Court25 nevertheless
affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that, in the instant
matter, any claim of legitimacy was foreclosed by the facts of
record.2 6
Although disallowing the defense to Texaco, the Court extended
validity to the term "functional discount," holding that "[a]t the
least, a functional discount that constitutes a reasonable reim-
bursement for the purchasers' actual marketing functions will not
violate the Act. '2 7 The Court went one step further, holding that
this "defense" falls outside of the "rigorous requirements" of the
section 2(a) cost justification defense.2" Thus, unless a functional
discount caused a price discrimination of the type prohibited by
the Act, such discount will not be covered by the Act. In this case,
respondents proved that Texaco's functional discount did in fact
22. Hasbrouck v Texaco, 634 F Supp 34. In a supplemental opinion the district court
assumed, arguendo, that Dompier was entitled to a functional discount even on the gas sold
at retail; but, nevertheless, the legality of the functional discounts were rebutted by evi-
dence that the amount of the discounts were not reasonably related to the cost of the func-
tions they performed. Id at 37-8.
23. Hasbrouck, 842 F2d at 1034.
24. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2538.
25. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor joined. Justice White filed an
opinion concurring in the result and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id.
26. Id. The Court relied upon the following facts of record Both distributors received
the full discount on all of their purchases, the majority of which was directly resold to con-
sumers; Texaco encouraged Dompier to expand its retail business fully aware of the reper-
cussions of its pricing policies; by refusing to allow respondents to transport their own fuel
from the Texaco plant, while at the same time allowing Gull and Dompier to do so, Texaco
inhibited upward integration. Id at 2550.
27. Id.
28. Id at 2545. "In theory, a supplier could try to defend a functional discount by
invoking the Act's cost justification defense, but the burden of proof with respect to the
defense is upon the supplier, and interposing the defense 'has proven difficult, expensive,
and often unsuccessful.' " Id at 2545, n.18 (citing E. Kintner & J. Bauer, 3 Federal Antitrust
Law § 23.19, 366-67 (Anderson Publishing Co. 1983): "Discounters will therefore likely find
it more useful to defend against claims under the Act by negating the causation element in
the case against them: a legitimate functional discount will not cause any substantial lessen-
ing of competition."). Id.
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cause a discrimination of the type prohibited by the Act.29
The Court stressed that for respondents to establish a violation
of the Act, they had the burden of proving four facts explicitly set
forth by section 2(a): (1) that Texaco's sales to Gull and Dompier
were made in interstate commerce; (2) that the gasoline sold to
respondents was of the same grade and quality as that sold to Gall
and Dompier; (3) that Texaco discriminated in price as between
Gull and Dompier on the one hand and respondents on the other;
and (4) that the discrimination had a prohibited effect on competi-
tion.30 Texaco argued that respondents had failed to establish: (1)
that Texaco did "discriminate in price" within the meaning of the
Act and (2). that, to the extent that Texaco sold to wholesalers, the
price differentials injured competition.3" Moreover, Texaco as-
serted that the decision of the court of appeals could not be af-
firmed without departing from established precedent whereby a
seller may legitimately offer functional discounts.2
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the legal status of func-
tional discounts by first examining the language of the Act, con-
cluding that there was no express reference to such a defense. 3
Furthermore, although the Act provided two affirmative defenses,34
neither were available to Texaco. 5
Texaco's argument that it did not discriminate within the mean-
ing of the Act was based upon a comment by Congressman Ut-
terback, a sponsor of the Act, which concluded that a relationship
must have existed between the parties to the discrimination which
would have entitled them to equal treatment." The Court con-
29. Hasbrouck. 110 S Ct at 2546. See note 11.
30. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2542-43 (citing 15 USC § 13(a)).
31. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2543.
32. Id at 2546. The Court believed that Texaco's assertion that to hold a supplier
liable for a functional discount is a "novel practice" was flawed and unsupported. The Court
rebutted this argument by citing cases which have held a supplier liable. Id at 2546-48. See
note 48.
33. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2542. Although the Court indicated that an earlier draft
of the Act did contain a proviso relating to functional discounts, they believed the deletion
"in no way detracts from the blunt direction of the statutory text, which indicates that any
price discrimination substantially lessening competition will expose the discriminator to lia-
bility, regardless of whether the discriminator attempts to characterize the pricing scheme
as a functional discount." Id at 2542, n.12.
34. 15 USC § 13(a), (b): the cost defense of section 2(a) and the good faith defense of
section 2(b).
35. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2542.
36. Id at 2543. The comment sets forth in pertinent part:
In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more than a mere difference.
Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship exists between
1991
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tended that such argument had previously been considered and re-
jected37 as being foreclosed by the text of the Act itself,38 conclud-
ing, "rather, a price discrimination within the meaning of that
provision is merely a price difference.
'39
Prior to Hasbrouck, the Supreme Court held in FTC v Morton
Salt Co,, 0 "that an injury to competition may be inferred from
evidence that some purchasers had to pay their supplier 'substan-
tially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay.' "941
Texaco argued that it would be, even in light of Morton Salt, "in-
consistent with fundamental antitrust policies to construe the Act
as requiring a seller to control his customers' resale prices."''2 This
argument rested on the position advanced in the Report of the At-
torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
(hereinafter "Report").'3 According to the Report, the Committee
would not hold suppliers liable for the consequences of customer
pricing tactics, recognizing that without functional discounts, dis-
tributors would possibly go uncompensated for services they per-
formed." Although the Court agreed with the Committee's posi-
tion, legitimizing reasonable functional discounts, 5 the Court
further recognized that a caveat exists relating to these discounts,
determining that there must be some relationship or connection
the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the
difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other.
80 Cong Rec 9416 (1936).
37. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2543. See FTC v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 US 536, 547-
51 (1960).
38. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2543. "In the context of a statute that plainly reveals a
concern with competitive consequences at different levels of distribution, and carefully de-
fines specific affirmative defenses, it would be anomalous to assume that the Congress in-
tended the term 'discriminate' to have such a limited meaning." Id.
The Court believed that to recognize such an argument would be to "create a blanket
exemption for all functional discounts. Indeed, if carried to its logical conclusion, it would
exempt all price differentials except those given to competing purchasers." Id.
39. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2544 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 363 US at 549).
40. 334 US 37 (1948).
41. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2544 (citing Morton Salt, 334 US at 46-7).
42. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2544. Texaco's position was supported by the United
States and the Federal Trade Commission as amici curiae. Id.
43. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws (1955).
44. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2544. "The Committee recommends, therefore, that sup-
pliers granting functional discounts either to single-function or to integrated buyers should
not be held responsible for any consequences of their customers' pricing tactics." Id (citing
Report at 208).
45. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2545.
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between the discount and the function performed." The Court
held that Texaco's discounts to Gull and Dompier violated the ba-
sic "hypothetical predicate" of the Committee Report, finding no
evidence of "due recognition and reimbursement" for any func-
tions performed by either of the wholesalers.47
Finally, the Court found Texaco's assertion that to hold them
liable for the discounts afforded the wholesalers was a departure
from prior decisions to be flawed."8 The fact that the "due recogni-
tion and reimbursement" concept was violated, along with a
stream of Federal Trade Commission cases disallowing those dis-
counts appearing as "subterfuge," clearly demonstrated that such a
decision in no way departs from established precedent.49
In a concurring opinion, Justice White agreed with the result
reached by the majority, but opposed extending wholesale validity
to functional discounts.50 Functional discounts, even those which
could be tied to legitimate cost saving functions performed by buy-
ers, would "derange [the] integrated statutory scheme" by proffer-
ing a defense not contained in the Act.5 Justice White believed it
would be inappropriate to recognize the defense without also defin-
ing limitations, especially in a case which does not require a defini-
tion of functional discount.2
46. Id.
On the other hand, the law should tolerate no subterfuge. For instance, where a
wholesaler-ietailer buys only part of his goods as a wholesaler, he must not claim a
functional discount on all. Only to the extent that a buyer actually performs certain
functions, assuming all the risk, investment, and costs involved, should he legally
qualify for a functional discount. Hence a distributor should be eligible for a discount
corresponding to any part of the function he actually performs on that part of the
goods for which he performs it.
Id (citing Report at 208 (cited in note 43)(emphasis added)).
47. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2546. "Indeed, Dompier was separately compensated for
its hauling function, and neither Gull nor Dompier maintained any significant storage facili-
ties." Id.
48. Id. Texaco made the assertion "despite [an] extraordinary absence of evidence to
connect the discount to any savings enjoyed by Texaco." Id.
49. Id. See for example, In re Sherwin Williams Co., 36 FTC 25, 70-71 (1943); In re
The Ruberoid Co., 46 FTC 379, 386, 5 (1950); In re Doubleday & Co., 52 FTC 169, 209
(1955); In re General Foods Corp., 52 FTC 798, 824-25 (1956); In re Boise Cascade Corp.,
107 FTC 76, 212, 214-15 (1986); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v Ford Motor Co., 543 F2d 1019,
1027 (2nd Cir 1976); Perkins v Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 US 642 (1969). Has-
brouck, 110 S Ct at 2546-48.
For a commentary on the "exception to the general rule," see Frederick M. Rowe, Price
Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 174, n.7 (Little Brown & Co. 1962).
50. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2552 (White concurrence).
51. Id (citing FTC v Anheuser Busch, Inc., 363 US 536 (1960)).
52. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2553.
1991
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, agreed with the ma-
jority in as far as the result reached, but also exhibited apprehen-
sions regarding an extension of legitimate status to "reasonable"
functional discounts. 3 The Justices considered the rationale of the
majority in distinguishing functional discounts from the cost justi-
fication defense to be "puzzling," especially when there exists no
express exception for functional discounts contained within the
Act itself. 4 The Justices were unable to discern a means of deter-
mining how such a discount may be deemed "reasonable" without
resorting to the "rigorous" means provided by the Act." Justices
Scalia and Kennedy concluded by emphasizing that the Court
should not decide the merits of functional discounts in the first
instance."6 They maintained that any arguments dealing with func-
tional discounts as a defense to section 2(a) of the Act, such argu-
ments being outside the express provisions of the Act, should be
addressed to Congress.7
One of the motivating forces underlying the Robinson-Patman
Amendments was the inability of the original Clayton Act to ade-
quately deal with secondary-line injuries, 8 or injuries which affect
the ability of a competitor of a favored buyer to compete. 9 Section
2 of the Act made certain pricing discriminations unlawful.60 Al-
though adequate in addressing the problems inherent at the time
of enactment, the Act would later fail to deal with the obstacles
faced by small business, especially the inability to compete with
the emerging chain stores. 1
53. Id (Scalia, Kennedy concurrence).
54. Id at 2555.
55. Id. See note 28.
56. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2554.
57. Id.
58. It is common parlance in dealing with Robinson-Patman Act cases to distinguish
between different types of injuries relative to the effected parties. A "primary-line injury" is
one which arises out of discrimination and the injury is to the competitors of the seller.
"Secondary-line injuries" are those which result from unfair competition between favored
and disfavored buyers. A "third-line injury" focuses on the impact of the discrimination on
the customers of either buyers or sellers. Earl W. Kintner and Joseph P. Bauer, 3 Federal
Antitrust Law § 20.9 at 127 (Anderson, 1983).
59. Id § 22.11 at 293.
60. Id § 22.2 at 250. "[Discrimination in price is unlawful] where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce." Clayton Act § 2, ch 322, 38 Stat 730 (1914).
61. Rowe, Price Discrimination § 1.2 at 6 (cited in note 49). The original Act also
contained a provision which allowed "quantity discounts," whereby even minor differences
in quantity would support a vast difference in price. This immunization soon gave the
emerging chain stores "carte blanche" for unlimited purchasing advantages. Id at 7-8.
Vol. 29:803
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The predicament facing the legislature at the turn of the century
was led by the emergence and development of large monopolies in
major American industries. 2 As a means of driving smaller com-
petitors out of business, "trusts '6 3 would selectively and geographi-
cally slash prices.4 The price cut would normally be offset in an-
other part of the country where the seller had a monopoly. 5
Congress' intent to curtail this problem was evident in the pro-
scribed activities of section 2 of the Act.6
Soon after enactment, the judiciary adopted a narrow view re-
garding the reach of section 2,67 limiting it to enforcing discrimina-
tion which affected only sellers.6 8 The Supreme Court soon re-
jected this narrow view, holding that section 2 of the Act was also
applicable to situations where the discrimination caused injury at
the buyer level. 9 This ruling, along with the lobbying efforts of
independent merchants seeking protection from the expanding
"chain store menace, ' 70 led to the enactment of the Robinson-Pat-
man Amendments. 71 The Amendments codified the broad reading
of the Supreme Court whereby buyers as well as sellers would be
protected from price discrimination.72
62. Earl W. Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 6 (Macmillan, 2d ed 1979).
63. A "trust" is defined as: "An association or organization of persons or corporations
having the intention and power, or tendency to create a monopoly . . . A device by which
several corporations engaged in the same general line of business might combine for their
mutual advantage." Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (West, 5th ed 1979).
64. Rowe, Price Discrimination §1.2 at 6 (cited in note 49).
65. Kintner, Robinson-Patman Primer at 7 (cited in note 62).
66. The House Judiciary Committee noted that:
Section 2 of the bill . . . is expressly designed with the view of correcting and forbid-
ding a common and widespread practice whereby certain great corporations . . . seek
to secure a monopoly in trade and commerce . . . by selling goods and merchandise
at a less price in the particular communities where their rivals are engaged in busi-
ness than at other places throughout the country.
H R Rep No 627, 63rd Cong, 2nd Sess 8-9 (1914).
67. See for example, National Biscuit Co. v FTC, 299 F 733 (2d Cir 1924), cert de-
nied, 266 US 613 (act of wholesaler in granting quantity discounts to purchasers would have
no effect unless the act substantially lessens competition or creates a monopoly between
sellers); Mennen Co. v FTC, 288 F 774 (2d Cir 1923), cert denied, 262 US 759 (the intent of
Congress in passing section 2 of the Act was limited to include only competition between
sellers).
68. Kintner and Bauer, 3 Antitrust § 22.2 at 250 (cited in note 58). Discrimination
affecting only sellers is a "primary-line" injury. Id.
69. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v American Can Co., 278 US 245 (1929).
70. Rowe, Price Discrimination at 8 (cited in note 49).
71. Id. For original text of Amendments see H R 8442, 74th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1935);
for subsequent revisions see 80 Cong Rec 8113, 8116-18 (1936); 80 Cong Rec 8122-23, 8139,
8223 (1936).
72. The Act would now make discrimination in price unlawful
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With the passage of the Amendments in 1936, functional dis-
counts and dual distribution 73 practices became very controversial
aspects of trade litigation.7' Although the Amendments did not
specifically address the legality of these areas, they did remove the
obstacles to administrative and judicial scrutiny 75 which were in-
herent in the Act. 76 Though the topic has received the attention of
Congress, 77 attempts to further amend the Act to mandate func-
tional discounts have never been successful.78
The courts have been, for the most part, silent as to the legality
of functional discounts under section 2(a). What has been estab-
lished is that the Act does not require "pricing rigidity. '79 This
means that, even where dual pricing schemes exist, if the discounts
where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
15 USC § 13(a). The Amendments also eliminated the quantity discount allowance if those
discounts did not reflect the cost savings of dealing with the larger purchases, i.e., did not
meet the cost justification defense. Rowe, Price Discrimination at 8 (cited in note 49).
73. A seller engages in dual distribution when he sells to both wholesalers and retail-
ers or both to retailers and ultimate consumers. Kintner and Bauer, 3 Antitrust § 22.14 at
311 (cited in note 58).
74. Terry Calvani, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 BC
Indust & Comm L Rev 543, 544 (1976).
75. For example, the Amendments affected an extension of the law to secondary-line
discrimination and elimination of the quantity discounts. See note 71.
76. Calvani, Functional Discounts at 545 (cited in note 74). Drafts of the Amend-
ments contained specific provisions which addressed functional pricing. The 1955 Report of
the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws concluded that such dis-
counts were "principal objects of Congressional concern." Although drafts from both houses
exempted functional discounts and also contained classification schemes for determining the
function performed, lobbying efforts by farm groups eliminated the scheme. Id at 545-46,
n.14.
77. See for example, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Small Business and
the Robinson-Patman Act of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong, 1st
Sess 291-334 (1969); The Impact Upon Small Business of Dual Distribution and Related
Vertical Integration, Report of Subcomm. No. 4 of House Select Comm. on Small Business,
H R Rep No 1943, 88th Cong, 2nd Sess 5-20 (1964); Hearings on the Impact Upon Small
Business of Dual Distribution and Related Vertical Integration Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
House Select Comm. on Small Business, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 1923-28 (1964); Hearings on
Dual Distribution in the Automatic Tire Industry Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong, 1st Sess, pt 1, at 131-38 (1959); Hearings on Func-
tional Discounts Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong, 2nd sess 1-164 (1958). Calvani, Functional Discounts at 544, n.6 (cited in note 74).
78. Kintner and Bauer, 3 Antitrust § 22.14 at 307, n.262 (cited in note 58). See for
example, H R 2170, 88th Cong, 1st Sess (1963); H R 12688, 94th Cong, 2nd Sess (1962); H R
12688, 94th Cong, 2nd Sess (1976). Kintner and Bauer, 3 Antitrust § 22.14 at 307, n.262
(cited in note 58).
79. FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v Ford Motor Co., 543 F2d 1019, 1025 (1976).
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afforded to one group are available to all other groups,"0 there will
be no violation of section 2(a). The decisions in this area, however,
equate such discounts with the cost justification defense rather
than granting separate "functional discount" status. 1 A separate
test establishing guidelines for functional discounts has been
avoided. 2
The Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter "FTC") has grap-
pled with the functional discount concept since the inception of
the Amendments.8 Two leading cases, In re Doubleday & Co.,
Inc.84 and In re Mueller Co.,85 emerged from FTC scrutiny.
In Doubleday, a book publisher who sold identical books at dif-
ferent prices to different purchasers was accused of violating sec-
tion 2(a). 6 Among the defenses set forth, one was based upon
functional discounts.8 " In its opinion, the FTC, after a brief inter-
lude into the history of functional discounts, described the status
of the discounts as "in a suspended state of confusion."88 In the
view of the FTC, the functions performed by purchasers should be
recognized and reimbursed by the seller.8" The allowance was qual-
ified however. The discounts must not be granted under the cover
of subterfuge and must be reasonably related to the expenses as-
sumed by the buyer.90 Under Doubleday, in the absence of subter-
80. FLM Collision, 543 F2d at 1025-26. This is known as the availability defense. See
also, Dayco Corp. v FTC, 362 F2d 180 (6th Cir 1966).
81. See for example, FTC v Anheuser-Busch Inc., 363 US 536 (1960); FTC v Borden
Co., 383 US 637 (1966); Purolator Prods., Inc. v FTC, 352 F2d 874 (7th Cir 1965), cert
denied, 389 US 1045 (1968).
82. The courts have used a combination of the cost justification defense and the "no
injury to competition" theory to approve a seller's granting of larger discounts to customers
who provided certain additional services to the seller. Refrigeration Engineering Corp. V
Frick Co., 370 F Supp 702, 713 (W D Tex 1974).
83. Arnold Celnicker and Bruce Seaman, Functional Discounts, Economic Price Dis-
crimination and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1989 Utah L Rev 813 (1989).
84. 52 FTC 169 (1955).
85. 60 FTC 120 (1962), aft'd, 323F2d 44 (7th Cir 1963), cert denied, 377 US 923
(1964). Celnicker and Seaman, 1989 Utah L Rev at 828 (cited in note 83).
86. Doubleday, 52 FTC at 195. Doubleday was also charged with violations of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Id.
87. Id at 196: "(4) that such price differences are not price differences at all but are
compensation by respondent to its customers for services and facilities rendered by the lat-
ter, varying in degrees and amounts in accordance with the amount of such compensation
available on proportionally equal terms to all of its customers . The defense of dual
distribution was also advanced. Id.
88. Id at 208.
89. Id at 209. "In our view, to relate functional discounts solely to the purchaser's
method of resale without recognition of his buying function thwarts competition and effi-




fuge, discounts which are no greater than the costs borne in pro-
viding the service cannot be the cause of competitive injury under
the Act. Applying this analysis to the facts in Doubleday, the Com-
missioner found that the publisher discounts afforded the pre-
ferred customers were not reimbursements for services rendered,
but mere price reductions."'
In Mueller, the FTC refused to accept the recognition reim-
bursement view espoused in Doubleday."2 Mueller Company, a
manufacturer and distributor of water and gas distribution prod-
ucts, maintained two categories of jobbers.9 3 The charge of a sec-
tion 2(a) violation arose from the fact that Mueller Company
granted a larger discount to one category of jobbers than was af-
forded to the other.9 4 Mueller argued that the disparity in dis-
counts was related to certain inventory functions performed by the
jobbers who received the larger discount. 5 The initial decision by
the Hearing Examiner dismissed the charge, finding that, in light
of Doubleday, the larger discount was no greater than necessary to
compensate the purchaser for the services rendered. 6 On appeal,
the FTC, in reversing the findings of the Hearing Examiner, held
that there was nothing in the amended Clayton Act to support the
addition of a defense related to functional discounts.9 7 The FTC
further stated that to allow a cost reduction which is reasonably
related to expenses assumed by the buyer would ignore the possi-
bility of a benefit derived by the business which performs the func-
tion, thereby allowing the preferred buyer a competitive advan-
tage.98 Under the Mueller rule, therefore, a seller cannot avoid the
inference of competitive injury merely by claiming that the dispar-
ity in discounts is reflected in cost savings achieved from the per-
91. Id.
92. Celnicker and Seaman, 1989 Utah L Rev at 828 (cited in note 83).
93. In re Mueller Co., 60 FTC 120, 123. A jobber is equivalent to a wholesaler, buying
and selling goods for others. Black's Law Dictionary 749 (West, 5th ed 1979). The two cate-
gories are referred to as "limit jobbers" and "regular jobbers." Mueller, 60 FTC at 123.
94. Id. The limit jobbers were allowed a discount of 25% on certain items sold while
the regular jobbers were afforded only a 15% discount on the same merchandise. Id.
95. Id. The limit jobbers maintained an inventory of the most commonly used prod-
ucts so as to supply to the user immediately upon request. The regular jobber maintained
no such inventories. Id.
96. Id at 124.
97. Id'at 127.
98. Id. The favored jobbers benefitted from the ability to provide better service than
their competitors because inventory was on hand for immediate delivery. Celnicker and Sea-
man, 1989 Utah L Rev at 831-32 (cited in note 83).
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formance of certain services by the preferred buyer.9 Accordingly,
the distinct and opposing viewpoints of Mueller and Doubleday
have fueled considerable debate. °0 In a more recent case, In re
Boise Cascade Corp,10 the FTC reconsidered that debate.
10 2
In Boise Cascade, the corporation, under attack for a section 2(f)
violation,10 3 based its major argument against liability on the claim
that the price paid to its suppliers included a discount which rep-
resented the value of certain distributional functions the suppliers
had performed.' 0 ' The Commission did not find issue in the dis-
count related to the sales at the wholesale level, but questioned
Boise's receipt of the same wholesale discount for goods which
were sold at retail.105 The retailers who were in competition with
Boise and who performed the same functions for which Boise was
compensated, did not receive the- discounts which were afforded
Boise. 06 In holding Boise liable, the FTC stressed that, even
though Boise claimed the price difference was no greater than its
costs of performing services. Boise was, nevertheless, afforded an
advantage over their competitors. 07 After a brief discussion of the
merits of each rule, the FTC rejected the Doubleday rule, stating
that the Mueller rule was more consistent with the purposes of the
Act.'08 Application of the Mueller rule in Boise led to the FTC's
finding of a violation of the Act.' 09 Reversal by the court of ap-
peals, however, precluded final disposition of the Mueller-
Doubleday debate. 0
99. In re Mueller, 60 FTC at 127 (rejecting the language of Doubleday).
100. Celnicker and Seaman, 1989 Utah L Rev at 828 (cited in note 83).
101. 107 FTC 76 (1986), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 837 F2d 1127 (D C Cir
1988).
102. Celnicker and Seaman, 1989 Utah L Rev at 828 (cited in note 83).
103. Section 2(f) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price
which is prohibited by this section." 15 USC § 13(f) (West 1973).
104. Boise Cascade, 107 FTC at 209. The complaint, brought by the competing retail-
ers, alleged that Boise Cascade "resells office product supplies at both the wholesale and
retail levels but receives a wholesale discount on all office product supplies it purchases from
certain suppliers. These wholesale discounts, however, are not available to all competitors of
respondent who sell these products at the retail level." Boise Cascade, 107 FTC at 77.
105. Id at 209.
106. Id.
107. Id at 212.
108. Id at 210. "The major legislative purpose behind the Robinson Patman Act was
to provide some measure of protection to small independent retailers and their independent
suppliers from what was thought to be unfair competition from vertically integrated, multi
location chainstores." Id (citing General Motors Corp., 103 FTC 641, 693-96 (1984)).
109. Boise Cascade, 107 FTC at 223.
110. Boise Cascade Corp. v FTC, 837 F2d 1127, 1148, n.19 (D C Cir 1988). The rever-
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The Hasbrouck Court denied the functional discount defense to
Texaco as being "foreclosed by the facts of record," i.e., no connec-
tion was found between the discount afforded the distributors Gull
and Dompier.1 The Court announced, however, that a price dif-
ferential that accords due recognition and reimbursement for ac-
tual functions performed does not trigger the presumption of an
injury to competition, hence declaring such discounts legal.11 2 This
holding is the Doubleday doctrine.
Surprisingly, the Hasbrouck Court went beyond the Doubleday
rule, "reject[ing] the requirement of exactitude which might be in-
ferred from Doubleday's dictum that a functional discount offered
to a buyer 'should not exceed the cost of that part of the function
he actually performs on that part of the goods for which he per-
forms it.' 1113 Even more surprising, the Court arrives at this seem-
ingly lax functional discount requirement without addressing the
relative merits of Mueller or Doubleday.'
1 4
By looking solely to cost savings as the basis for allowing a func-
tional discount, the Court undermines the major legislative pur-
pose behind the Robinson-Patman Amendments. As stated earlier,
prior to enactment of the Amendments, small independent retail-
ers were being decimated by the large chain stores. The Amend-
ments were meant to provide some measure of protection to those
disadvantaged retailers."' Under Hasbrouck, not only may suppli-
ers relay cost savings to buyers which are based on functions per-
formed by those buyers, but these discounts may exceed the sav-
ings enjoyed by the suppliers. Furthermore, the Doubleday
doctrine, as embraced by the Hasbrouck Court, fails to take into
account competitive disadvantages other than those inherent in
cost differences. 1 These other types of competitive disadvantages
were squarely covered under the Mueller decision and should be, if
the legislative purpose of the Amendments is to be followed, in-
sal "obviate[d] any need to chose sides once and for all between [the two rules]." Boise
Cascade, 837 F2d at 1148. The findings were reversed on other grounds (error on evidence
admissibility) which precluded "declaring in this case whether the champions of Mueller or
those of Doubleday should be the ultimate winners in the long-lived struggle over the appli-
cation of Robinson-Patman . . ." Id at 1143.
111. See note 25 and accompanying text.
112. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2543.
113. Id at 2547, n.21 (citing In re Doubleday, 52 FTC at 209).
114. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2547.
115. Boise Cascade, 107 FTC at 210.
116. The concurring opinion of Justice White finds fault with this omission which he




cluded under the Hasbrouck rule.
The Act itself clearly makes no mention of a defense based upon
functional discounts. Early drafts of the Robinson-Patman
Amendments dealt specifically with functional discounts, but were
dropped from the final text." 7 It is uncertain whether this exclu-
sion points to legislative disapproval of the discounts or to the pre-
sumption that, if Congress truly wanted to forbid the practice,
they would have expressly done so." 8 A look back at Congressional
attentiveness to the matter tends to support the former interpreta-
tion. Time after time, Congress has failed to gain enough support
to further amend the Act to mandate functional discounts." 9 Per-
haps Congress has envisioned the myriad competitive disadvan-
tages which may arise under the guise of the functional discount,
disadvantages clearly inconsistent with the aforementioned legisla-
tive purpose.
The Court leaves further room for controversy by not only al-
lowing a defense which the Act fails to mention, but by declaring
that such defense need not meet the "rigorous requirements of the
cost justification defense."' 120 It does indeed seem "puzzling" as to
what would make a functional discount reasonable unless that dis-
count meets the cost justification requirement of the Act.' 2' A defi-
nition of what may constitute "reasonable" must be established if
the Court is intent on instituting the functional discount defense.
The Court has, by recognizing the functional discount via a leni-
ent Doubleday approach, convoluted the process while apparently
attempting simplification. The likely result is a resurrection of the
Doubleday-Mueller debate, a flood of litigants attempting to test
the newly-proffered waters, and a general disadvantageous envi-.
ronment for the small, independent retailer who relied upon the
recognition of competitive disadvantages other than those based
purely on cost. Mueller took into account these aspects and was,
for all purposes, the better rule. The Court should have stopped
short of endorsing functional discounts and should merely have
stated that there was no connection between the discounts offered
by Texaco and the services performed by Gull and Dompier, so
that Texaco was guilty of a section 2(a) violation. By reviving
117. Boise Cascade, 107 FTC at 209. See S Rep No 1502, 74th Cong, 2nd Sess 5
(1936).
118. S Rep No 1502, 74th Cong, 2nd Sess 5.
119. See note 77.
120. Hasbrouck, 110 S Ct at 2555 (Scalia, Kennedy concurrence).
121. Id.
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Doubleday, the Supreme Court has caused more harm than good,
forcing anew the confusion surrounding the legality of the func-
tional discount.
Richard Albert
